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Culture of peace

Letter dated 31 October 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour, on behalf of the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, to forward herewith copies of:

(a) The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) (see annex I);

(b) A press statement issued by the Chairperson of the Ninth ASEAN Summit and the Seventh ASEAN Plus Three Summit (see annex II).

As you may be aware, those documents were issued at the Ninth ASEAN Summit, which was convened in Bali, Indonesia, on 7 and 8 October 2003.

In this regard, I have the further honour to kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 44. For your information, comprehensive reports and documents are also available at the following ASEAN web sites:

http://www.aseansec.org and http://www.9aseansummit.com

(*Signed*) Rezlan Ishar **Jenie**
Ambassador,
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex I to the letter dated 31 October 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam,

RECALLING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed satisfaction with the overall progress made in the region,

NOTING in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the deepening of regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia,

CONSCIOUS of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its member states and people as well as the need to further strengthen the Association's guidelines in achieving a more coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them,

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995),

COGNIZANT that the future of ASEAN cooperation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004) and its succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA),

CONFIRMING further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in order to preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples,

REAFFIRMING the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation,

REITERATING that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is an effective code of conduct for relations among governments and peoples,

RECOGNIZING that sustainable economic development requires a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation and political solidarity,

COGNIZANT of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN member countries to adopt "Prosper Thy Neighbour" policies in order to ensure the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region;

REITERATING the importance of rules-based multilateral trading system that is equitable and that contributes towards the pursuit of development;

REAFFIRMING that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony;

DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT:

1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region;

2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and among their peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN Community that is open, dynamic and resilient;

3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective ASEAN Member Countries and shall urgently and effectively address the challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony;

4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means;

5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is the key code of conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace and stability in the region;

6. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region;

7. ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its internal economic integration and linkages with the world economy to realize an ASEAN Economic Community through a bold, pragmatic and unified strategy;

8. ASEAN shall further build on the momentum already gained in the ASEAN+3 process so as to further draw synergies through broader and deeper cooperation in various areas;

9. ASEAN shall build upon opportunities for mutually beneficial regional integration arising from its existing initiatives and those with partners, through enhanced trade and investment links as well as through IAI process and the RIA;

10. ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and promote a common regional identity;

DO HEREBY ADOPT:

The framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community

A. ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC)

1. The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives.

2. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.

3. ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation. Member Countries shall exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs.

4. The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.

5. Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community.

6. Existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, and the SEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution.

7. The High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve all differences, disputes and conflicts peacefully.

8. The ASEAN Security Community shall contribute to further promoting peace and security in the wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN's determination to move forward at a pace comfortable to all. In this regard, the ARF shall remain the main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force.

9. The ASEAN Security Community is open and outward looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners to promote peace and stability in the region, and shall build on the ARF to facilitate consultation and cooperation between ASEAN and its friends and Partners on regional security matters.

10. The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes, and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian

Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF.

11. The ASEAN Security Community shall explore enhanced cooperation with the United Nations as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

12. ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.

B. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)

1. The ASEAN Economic Community is the realisation of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020.

2. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on a convergence of interests among ASEAN members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing and new initiatives with clear timelines.

3. The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base, turning the diversity that characterises the region into opportunities for business complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain. ASEAN's strategy shall consist of the integration of ASEAN and enhancing ASEAN's economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); accelerate regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the improvement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of any economic disputes. As a first step towards the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall implement the recommendations of the **High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration as annexed**.

4. The ASEAN Economic Community shall ensure that deepening and broadening integration of ASEAN shall be accompanied by technical and development cooperation in order to address the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam through IAI and RIA so that the benefits of ASEAN integration are shared and enable all ASEAN Member Countries to move forward in a unified manner.

5. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and cooperation measures. There is a need to enhance cooperation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.

C. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY (ASCC)

1. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies.

2. In line with the programme of action set by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Community shall foster cooperation in social development aimed at raising the standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and shall seek the active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities.

3. ASEAN shall ensure that its work force shall be prepared for, and benefit from, economic integration by investing more resources for basic and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. The development and enhancement of human resources is a key strategy for employment generation, alleviating poverty and socio-economic disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity. ASEAN shall continue existing efforts to promote regional mobility and mutual recognition of professional credentials, talents, and skills development.

4. ASEAN shall further intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, and support joint regional actions to increase access to affordable medicines. The security of the Community is enhanced when poverty and diseases are held in check, and the peoples of ASEAN are assured of adequate health care.

5. The Community shall nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and media practitioners to help preserve and promote ASEAN's diverse cultural heritage while fostering regional identity as well as cultivating people's awareness of ASEAN.

6. The Community shall intensify cooperation in addressing problems associated with population growth, unemployment, environmental degradation and transboundary pollution as well as disaster management in the region to enable individual members to fully realize their development potentials and to enhance the mutual ASEAN spirit.

We hereby pledge to our peoples our resolve and commitment to bring the ASEAN Community into reality and, for this purpose, task the concerned Ministers to implement this Declaration.

Done in Bali, Indonesia, on the Seventh Day of October in the Year Two Thousand and Three.

For Brunei Darussalam

HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the Kingdom of Cambodia

SAMDECH HUN SEN
Prime Minister

For the Republic of Indonesia

MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI
President

For the Lao People's Democratic Republic

BOUNNHANG VORACHITH
Prime Minister

For Malaysia

DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD
Prime Minister

For the Union of Myanmar

GENERAL KHIN NYUNT
Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President

For the Republic of Singapore

GOH CHOK TONG
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand

DR. THAKSIN SHINAWATRA
Prime Minister

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

PHAN VAN KHAI
Prime Minister

Annex II to the letter dated 31 October 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Press statement issued on 7 October 2003 by the Chairperson of the Ninth ASEAN Summit and the Seventh ASEAN Plus Three Summit, held at Bali, Indonesia

1. ASEAN leaders held a very productive meeting this morning following a working dinner last night. It was our Ninth Summit since 1976. Subsequently, we met with leaders from China, Japan, and Republic of Korea, during which we had a very fruitful discussion. This was our seventh "ASEAN+3" Summit since 1997.

2. We took note of the timeliness of the convening of this Summit that our region is being confronted with fundamental changes on the global scene. In responding to those changes as well as present and future challenges, we underlined the importance of a higher degree of coherence of efforts to achieve the objectives of ASEAN Vision 2020 with those aimed at achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and with those in pursuit of our national development agenda.

3. During the ASEAN Summit, we discussed issues of common concern to all members, including political and economic developments, in particular the latest situation on the Korean Peninsula, recent developments on terrorism and the issue of Iraq and the Middle East. ASEAN Leaders also pledged to achieve an ASEAN Community by the year 2020 which would rest on the three pillars of "ASEAN Security Community", "ASEAN Economic Community" and "ASEAN Socio-cultural Community" embodied in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II).

4. At the ASEAN + 3 Summit, we pledged to strengthen our bonds and partnership with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and bring these in line with our strategy of reinforcing ASEAN's competitiveness through mutually-beneficial trade and investment cooperation.

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

5. During our discussions at the ASEAN Summit, we were gratified to note the development and progress of ASEAN since the inception of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia in 1976. We gladly noted the accession to the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) by China and India. We noted with appreciation the intention of some Dialogue Partners to accede to the Treaty. We encouraged other countries, particularly our Dialogue Partners, to do so.

6. We fully acknowledged the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association working for the well being of its peoples. We also affirmed the need to further strengthen the guidelines for achieving a coherent and clear path of ASEAN cooperation with reference to ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004) and succeeding plans of action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for Integration of ASEAN (RIA).

7. We were also delighted to note the deepening of regional economic integration in the Southeast Asian region. We reaffirmed our primary responsibility to strengthen the economic and social stability of the region and to ensure peaceful and progressive national development. We reiterated our determination to protect our region's stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in accordance with ideals and aspirations of our peoples. For the sustainability of our region's economic development we affirmed the need for a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation. In this regard, we reiterated that ASEAN is envisioning the TAC as a fully functioning and effective code of conduct governing relations between states.

8. We also reaffirmed our commitment to enhance ASEAN's economic linkages with the world economy, including through the ASEAN+3 process, in order to realize an ASEAN Economic Community by adopting a bold, pragmatic and unified strategy.

ASEAN Community

9. At the 9th ASEAN Summit, we adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) to reaffirm ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership, in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies.

10. We agreed to establish an ASEAN Community that would be supported by the three pillars of "political and security cooperation", "economic cooperation", and "socio-cultural cooperation." These would be closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing in the effort to achieve peace, stability and prosperity. We agreed that through this effort we would reach a closer and mutually beneficial integration among our member countries and among our peoples. We also agreed to continue our efforts to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to realizing a dynamic and resilient ASEAN Community. To this end, we adopted the framework to achieve this ASEAN Community through ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. We agreed to task our Ministers to implement the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II.

ASEAN Security Community (ASC)

11. We envisaged that the ASEAN Security Community would bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane, and would ensure that ASEAN members live in peace with one another and in peace with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.

12. We also agreed that members of the ASEAN Security Community would rely exclusively on peaceful means in the settlement of intra regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, would subscribe to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.

13. We emphasized that the ASEAN Security Community should fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism and other trans-national crimes, and should work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remained free of all weapons of mass destruction. It should enable ASEAN to demonstrate greater capacity and responsibility to serve as the primary driving force of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

14. We emphasized that the High Council of the TAC would be a principal instrument of the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve all differences, disputes, and conflicts peacefully.

15. We recognized that maritime issues and concerns were trans-boundary in nature, and therefore should be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. To this end, we underlined the need to establish an ASEAN maritime forum. We agreed that maritime cooperation in ASEAN contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community.

16. We decided to explore innovative ways of enhancing our security and to establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. In this regard, we approved our officials' recommendation that Indonesia develop the Plan of Action for the ASEAN Security Community which would be reported to the 37th AMM in Jakarta in 2004 and would be

Action is part and parcel of the Bali Concord II, thus it would be treated as an Annex to the Bali Concord II

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

17. We agreed that the ASEAN Economic Community enhance ASEAN competitiveness, improve ASEAN's investment environment and narrow the development gap amongst ASEAN members. We emphasized that the ASEAN Economic Community would be the realization of the end-goal of the economic integration stipulated in ASEAN Vision 2020.

18. We noted that our Ministers had deliberated on the concept of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and we agreed on the creation of AEC to achieve deeper economic integration of the region, as outlined in the Roadmap for Integration of ASEAN (RIA) and Vision 2020. We further noted that the AEC would be characterized by a single market and production base, with free flow of goods, services, investment and labor, and freer flow of capital.

19. We recognized that the realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and cooperation measures. There is a need to enhance cooperation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources development and capacity building, recognition of educational qualifications, closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies, trade financing measures, enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity, development of electronic transaction though e-ASEAN, integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing, and enhancing private sector involvement.

20. The leaders exchanged views on the possibility of advancing the end date of the AEC and the idea of adopting a "2+x" approach to ASEAN economic integration besides the existing "ASEAN-x" formula. In the 2+x approach, it was proposed two countries that are ready to cooperate on specific sectors could work together first. To further enhance ASEAN's integration, each member country is supposed to designate a minister who would be national focal point for ASEAN economic integration.

21. To achieve an integrated economic community, we adopted a progressive approach as outlined in the Recommendations of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration and as annexed to the Bali Concord II.

ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC)

22. We envisaged an ASEAN Socio-cultural Community in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, in which we would be bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies. Through the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, we could foster our cooperation in social and rural population, and at the same time, seek the active involvement of all sectors of society, including women, youth and community groups. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community would intensify cooperation in addressing problems associated with population growth, education, unemployment, prevention of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, environmental degradation and trans-boundary pollution. In this regard, we supported our officials' recommendation to ask the Philippines to develop the Plan of Action for the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community which would be reported to the 37th AMM in Jakarta in 2004 and subsequently endorsed by the Leaders at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane in 2004. The Plan on Action is part and parcel of the Bali Concord II, thus it would be treated as an Annex to the Bali Concord II.

Regional and International Political and Economic Issues

23. We firmly agreed to continue to undertake and build on the specific measures outlined in the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which we adopted in Brunei Darussalam in November 2001. We committed ourselves to intensifying our efforts, collectively and individually, to

to maintain practical cooperative measures among ourselves and with the international community

24 We reaffirmed our determination to work together in mitigating the adverse impact of terrorist attacks on ASEAN countries and urged the international community to assist us in these efforts We pledged to ensure the security and harmony of our societies and the safety of our peoples and also of others visiting or residing in our countries and in the region

25 The Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the Government's pledge to bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconciliation The roadmap as outlined by the Prime Minister of Myanmar that would involve all strata of Myanmar society is a pragmatic approach and deserves understanding and support The Leaders also agree that sanctions are not helpful in promoting peace and stability essential for democracy to take root

26 We noted that current developments in Iraq and the Middle East remained cause for great concern With regard to post-war situation in Iraq, we reaffirmed our position that the United Nations must continue to play a central role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq in accordance with the aspirations of its people and with the UN's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

27 ASEAN Leaders reiterated their support for the Roadmap for Peace initiative to end the violence in the Middle East and to secure durable peace on the basis of justice and which would lead to the realization of a viable Palestinian state We reaffirmed the right to peaceful co-existence of all states in the region within recognized and secure boundaries

Other Matters

28 We took note of the need for a comprehensive approach and better cross-sectoral coordination to improve ASEAN mechanisms and processes and thereby ensure effective implementation of decisions In this regard, we stressed the need to revive the Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM), which would function as a filtering mechanism that would enable us to focus on the most important issues of common concern

29 We reaffirmed the decisions we reached at the ASEAN+China Summit on SARS in April 2003, and the timely follow-up action by our Health Ministers that resulted from their meeting in June 2003 We underlined the need to further strengthen cooperation among the health and other relevant agencies to promote, and facilitate the exchange and sharing of information as well as strengthen the early warning system to deal with and prevent the spread of SARS and other communicable diseases

30 We agree to maintain our support for the role of the ASEAN Business Advisory Council as a key component to the overall strategy of increasing the private sector s presence in ASEAN economic policy deliberations We took note of ABAC recommendations on the need to increase competitiveness of ASEAN companies, especially SMEs, in the global market, particularly in the field of tourism and agriculture To this end, we underlined the need for closer coordination between the private sector and relevant government agencies in the implementation of the recommendations

Deepening East Asia Cooperation

31 We held discussions with our colleagues from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea on regional and international political, security and economic issues We also consolidated and reaffirmed our cooperation and partnership with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

32 ASEAN+3 Leaders expressed concern at the recent terrorist attacks in Jakarta and at the UN Headquarters in Iraq We reiterated our determination to intensify our joint efforts in combating terrorism in East Asia and our commitment to support global efforts to fight terrorism

33. ASEAN+3 Leaders welcomed and firmly supported the adoption of the Bali Concord II.

34. We exchanged views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and reaffirmed our commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing the Korean Peninsula through dialogue. We welcomed the convening of the Six-Party Talk as a positive step towards this end, and we will work together to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula.

35. We endorsed the Implementation Strategy of the Short-Term Measures of the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG). We pointed out that the Strategy would ensure that the measures would be implemented effectively, efficiently and systemically. We welcomed the Report of the ASEAN+3 Study Group as presented by the Prime Minister of Japan on Facilitation and Promotion Exchange of People and Human Resources Development and appreciated the initiative taken in implementing the short-term measures as recommended by the Group. We held discussions on the progress of the Initiative for Development in East Asia in the framework of ASEAN+3 Cooperation.

36. We also explored some new ideas such as to study the feasibility of East Asia Free Trade Area.

37. Finally, we committed ourselves to sustaining the ASEAN+3 process so as to achieve greater synergy through broader and deeper cooperation.

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Agenda item 29
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

Letter dated 31 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the declaration of the Cuban non-governmental organizations against the embargo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 29.

(*Signed*) Bruno **Rodríguez Parrilla**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

02-60590 (E) 131103 131103

Annex to the letter dated 31 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration of the Cuban Non-Governmental Organizations against the Embargo

The Cuban non-governmental organizations, having been informed that on 4 November 2003 the General Assembly of the United Nations, after examining the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies of 86 Governments and 19 organs and agencies of the United Nations system, will discuss and vote on the draft resolution submitted by Cuba entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba" and meeting in their Forum against the Embargo, have agreed to issue the following declaration:

The genocidal policy of imposing an economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba is grounded in the expansionist designs of the United States of America, reflected in the so-called Monroe Doctrine and the Manifest Destiny concept, which are instruments for penetration and interference in the Latin American and Caribbean republics that in the case of Cuba have been reinforced by the "geographical destiny" and "ripe apple" theories and action such as intervention in Cuba's War of Independence against Spain, the subsequent interventional government, the imposition of the Platt Amendment and a military base in Guantánamo, various direct interventions by United States troops, the fraudulent Reciprocity Agreements and the control of our economy and trade during the first half of the twentieth century.

The imposition and intensification of the embargo reflect the conflict between a free and sovereign Cuba and a dependent Cuba subject or annexed to the United States of America. It is clear to all of us that the aim of the embargo policy is to destroy the Cuban nation and impose the will of the United States on our little country through coercion and force, in defiance of the norms of international law and against the will and determination of the Cuban people to defend their sovereignty and their right to self-determination.

The embargo imposed on Cuba has caused enormous damage to the Cuban economy, officially estimated at over $72 billion, not including the $54 billion in direct damage caused to economic targets and individuals through acts of sabotage and terrorism promoted, organized and financed from the United States.

The human costs have been incalculable. The embargo has made it impossible to save lives, including those of children who have been denied essential medicines, or to alleviate the pain and suffering of the sick. These costs have been reduced as a result of the efforts and sacrifices of health workers, but the moral damage cannot be quantified.

Similarly, projects aimed at promoting the material and spiritual development of society, including cultural, educational, religious, scientific and sports projects involving the interaction of innumerable social actors, including non-governmental organizations, could have progressed much further had they not been hindered by the embargo policy and the attendant unjust laws.

We are convinced that the economic war being waged by the United States against Cuba has no legal foundation and that according to the provisions of article II (c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on 9 December 1948, it qualifies as an act of genocide, thus constituting a crime under international law and a veritable and completely flagrant, massive and systematic violation of the human rights of the Cuban people as a whole.

The Cuban non-governmental organizations recognize and applaud the enormous efforts that the Cuban Government and Cuban institutions are making to ensure that despite the difficulties and damage caused by the economic war being waged against Cuba, our people can enjoy substantial social, economic and cultural benefits and continue their development with a view to further improving their quality of life.

Similarly, the Forum condemns the genocidal policy applied to our country by successive United States Governments and reaffirms its full support for the Cuban Government as regards the adoption of the measures necessary to defeat or frustrate the aim of the embargo, namely to starve Cuba into submission, and to defend at all costs our sovereignty and national independence and our right to create a better life.

The Cuban non-governmental organizations associate themselves with the well-founded call for free trade with United States producers and traders, to the benefit of both parties, according to internationally established rules, especially with a view to the acquisition by Cuban enterprises and institutions of food, medicines, medical equipment and educational, cultural and technological materials for the benefit of our children, our men and women, Cubans young and old, the handicapped and our people as a whole, as well as the right of our intellectuals, scientists, artists and athletes to enjoy free access to the sources of knowledge and information existing in the United States and exchange with them our own knowledge, thus promoting mutual friendship and understanding between our peoples.

The Cuban non-governmental organizations express their deep gratitude for the support and assistance received from the institutions and organizations of fraternal peoples, including the people of the United States itself, and invite them to continue increasing their support until we are victorious in our struggle. United States citizens are likewise suffering the effects of this policy of their Government, which prevents them from fully exercising their constitutional rights and liberties in their relations with Cuba.

As part of its efforts to isolate Cuba, the United States Government has sought to internationalize its aggressive policy in every possible area, exerting pressure of all kinds on Governments, institutions and individuals in other countries and resorting to lies and distortions of the truth.

The Cuban non-governmental organizations urge the Governments of the States members of the European Union to dissociate themselves from any act that contributes to the enforcement of the economic embargo imposed by the United States Government against Cuba and to reject completely the extraterritorial policies embodied in the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts. We also call upon the European non-governmental and social organizations to step up their actions in that area.

We likewise appeal to the conscience of the world, requesting that all possible ways and means be used to help end the embargo against our country.

We, the non-governmental organizations, as actors in Cuban society, committed to this wonderful people and its programme of social action, declare unambiguously that we will remain loyal to our homeland and to Fidel and will do everything in our power to help guarantee our independence, our national sovereignty and the social, political and economic victories won during these years of struggle.

Havana, 29 October 2003

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Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994

Revised estimates arising in respect of Security Council resolution 1512 (2003) on the establishment of five additional ad litem judges in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The Security Council, by its resolution 1512 (2003) of 27 October 2003, decided to authorize the use of up to nine ad litem judges at any one time in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The present report sets out the resource requirements for the biennium 2004-2005 arising from the establishment of five additional ad litem judges in the Tribunal, which would be further to the number of ad litem judges previously approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 57/289.

The estimated additional requirements would amount to $12,239,600 gross ($11,193,400 net), with an additional 45 temporary posts, thus increasing the overall requirements for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the biennium 2004-2005 from US$ 239,148,800 gross ($216,275,800 net) to $251,388,400 gross ($227,469,200 net) at 2004-2005 rates.

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I. Introduction

1. The Secretary-General, in a letter dated 3 October 2003, conveyed for the consideration of the Security Council a letter dated 29 September 2003 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Judge Erik Mose (S/2003/946).

2. In his letter, Judge Mose requested the Security Council to amend the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda so that the Tribunal would be authorized to make use of up to nine ad litem judges at any one time, rather than a maximum of four, as at present. Strengthening the Tribunal's judicial capacity from four ad litem judges to nine ad litem judges would most probably place it in a position to complete all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, the target that the Security Council set in its resolution 1503 (2003) of 28 August 2003, or would at least enable the Tribunal to come very close to achieving that target. If the Tribunal's Trial Chamber capacity were to remain unchanged, it would take until 2011 for the Tribunal to complete trials of those suspects currently being prosecuted or still at large.

3. By its resolution 1512 (2003) of 27 October 2003, the Security Council decided to amend articles 11 and 12 quater of the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, thereby authorizing the use of a maximum at any one time of nine ad litem independent judges.

4. The introduction of five additional ad litem judges, which will assist in disposing of the pending caseload of the Chambers, will require additional resources in terms of staffing and related costs. The additional resources related to the five additional ad litem judges, inclusive of 45 new support staff, general temporary assistance, travel, contractual services, general operating expenses, supplies, equipment and related services, as set out in tables 1 and 2, would amount to US$ 12,239,600 gross ($11,193,400 net).

5. According to current estimates and under the current judicial capacity, it would take 3 bienniums in addition to the 2004-2005 biennium and estimated resource requirements in the amount of $956.0 million (at 2004-2005 rates) in order for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to complete its work. By contrast, with a maximum of nine ad litem judges at any one time, it would take 1.5 bienniums in addition to the 2004-2005 beinnium for the Tribunal to deliver its mandate. The estimated additional requirements would amount to $12 million per biennium, or a total of $30 million (at 2004-2005 rates) through 2008, resulting in estimated savings for the Tribunal of $328.1 million ($950.6 million less $628.5 million).

II. Indicative resource requirements

6. The overall changes in resource requirements for the biennium 2004-2005 are set out in tables 1 and 2. The requirements are proportionately comparable to the level of resources approved by the General Assembly previously when ad litem judges were first introduced to both the Tribunal for Rwanda and the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Table 1
Requirements by object of expenditure

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*A/58/269*	*A/58/368*	*S/RES/1512 (2003)*	*Revised estimated requirements*[a]
Posts	149 601.8	3 217.9	6 657.7	159 477.4
Other staff costs	25 253.2	-	353.8	25 607.0
Non-staff compensation	6 867.4	-	2 400.1	9 267.5
Consultants and experts	1 158.6	-	292.4	1 451.0
Travel of representatives	477.1	-	45.0	522.1
Travel of staff	5 262.4	200	-	5 462.4
Contractual services	1 505.3	-	-	1 505.3
General operating expenses	12 907.7	-	206.4	13 114.1
Hospitality	6.9	-	-	6.9
Supplies and materials	3 331.4	-	10.0	3 341.4
Furniture and equipment	4 887.2	-	920.0	5 807.2
Improvement of premises	168.6	-	308.0	476.6
Grants and contributions	1 430.3	-	-	1 430.3
Staff assessment	22 319.2	553.8	1 046.2	23 919.2
Total requirements (gross)	**235 177.1**	**3 971.7**	**12 239.6**	**251 388.4**
Staff assessment	22 319.2	553.8	1 046.2	23 919.2
Total requirements (net)	**212 857.9**	**3 417.9**	**11 193.4**	**227 469.2**

[a] Revised estimated requirements at 2004-2005 rates.

Table 2
Post requirements

Category	*A/58/269*	*A/58/368*	*S/RES/1512 (2003)*	*Revised estimated requirements*
Professional and above				
USG	-	1	-	1
ASG	1	-	-	1
D-2	1	-	-	1
D-1	4	-	-	4
P-5	29	1	1	31
P-4	82	4	6	92
P-3	154	3	8	165
P-2/1	112	2	5	119
Subtotal	**383**	**11**	**20**	**414**
General Service				
Principal level	7	-	-	7
Other level	175	2	10	187
Security	87	-	-	87
Local level	308	(1)	15	322
Field Service	24	1	-	25
Subtotal	**601**	**2**	**25**	**628**
Total	**984**	**13**	**45**	**1 042**

III. Conclusion

7. The additional requirements contained in the present report, which arose from Security Council resolution 1512 (2003), would require an adjustment to the proposed budget for 2004-2005, contained in the reports of the Secretary-General (A/58/269 and A/58/368), which are currently before the General Assembly.

8. **Accordingly, on the basis of the proposals in the present report, it is estimated that additional resources in the amount of $12,239,600 gross ($11,193,400 net) will be required for the proposed use of five additional ad litem judges. An additional amount of $1,046,200 would be required for staff assessment to be offset by income from staff assessment of the same amount.**